This was an engaging and informative book and I enjoyed reading it. Having read the authors book about Chernobyl I knew I liked his writing style and I was not disappointed. Recommended.

This is a fascinating look at the Cuban Missile Crisis and it gives interesting insights into the motivation of both the US and USSR.

Powerful and ultimately chilling account of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At no point in human history has the world come so close to mutually assured destruction.

Whilst this book is not for light reading, I greatly enjoyed this view of the Cuban Missile crisis. It's a topic I knew only briefly and the depth of this book was fascinating and very interesting. A good read for History buffs.

I was turned onto this title after seeing the author win the Ballie Gifford, a non-fiction literary prize i follow closely for non-fiction recommendations.
Certainly, a book for history lovers and buffs, as its length and detail may appear too dense to more casual interest readers. extremely well researched and referenced, impressively readable for the detail. will look out for their next book on another interesting history

In 2019, two world superpowers, the United States and Russia withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty which was negotiated at the end of the Cold War by US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. As of 2 August 2019, the two countries announced their final withdrawal from the treaty. Many did not realise that our world is once again in danger of the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Our situation is not that different from the early 1960s when the use of such weaponry was an inseparable part of military doctrine on both sides of the Cold War. Russia is no longer a communist country, but the communist expansionist doctrine has been replaced with some kind of mission of defending conservative values and its staunch support of authoritarian regimes, exacerbated with cultural differences putting nuclear arms once again on a higher pedestal.

1962 will forever be remembered as a year when our world was on the brink of extinction with the escalation of the Cold War upon American discovery of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Castro’s regime in Cuba was not yet matured that year. Only three years have passed since Castro’s revolution successfully overthrew the US-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. There was an imminent threat of American invasion, although Castro has spoken frankly that he was not a communist. This situation happened coincidentally with the failure of Soviet engineers to develop an effective Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Khrushchev wanted to close the nuclear gap, fearing the American attack with their long-range missiles dubbed as Minuteman which could be launched within a minute and reach Soviet territory, whereas the most effective missiles so far developed by Soviet engineers were the middle-range R-12 missiles which have the capability to hit any nearby European cities, but not as far as the US. His solution is as adventurous as what the Eisenhower administration did to close the gap several years previously, by putting the Middle-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) in Cuba.

Serhii Plokhy writes a really detailed account of the nuclear conflict between the US and the USSR in 1962. My knowledge of the Cuban Missile Crisis was mainly supplied by Lawrence Friedman’s book Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam which happens to chronicle the conflicts in four parts of the world during the short period of Kennedy’s administration. This book specifically highlights the nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis which was initially created by the missile gap between the US and the USSR but then escalated by the frequent misunderstandings between Kennedy who was deemed inexperienced by the Soviet leadership with Khrushchev who took adventurous decision supported by his sycophantic comrades in Moscow. I didn’t initially expect this, but this book even chronicles the hardship experienced by Soviet military staff who had to be concealed by staying inside the bunker of the ship under intense heated temperature during the shipping of nuclear arms from Odesa in Ukraine to Cuba.

One thing that is gone out of the equation from Khrushchev adventurism was Castro’s attitude during the escalation that made it more difficult to negotiate a peaceful solution even after general secretary U Thant of the UN intervened in the removal of the nuclear arms. The drama could simply be seen as an adventure from Khrushchev that was escalated by American fear, even though NATO previously put American nuclear arsenals in Turkey several years previously based on the same reason to close the nuclear gap. This fact was misunderstood, resulting in a countless ultimatum from the US to their Soviet counterparts to remove the missiles and a blockade of Cuba. When Khrushchev finally backed down in his mission, the obstacle appeared in the form of Castro’s reluctancy to allow the UN to enter Cuban territory to inspect the removal of nuclear arms, fearing the world will see Cuba as a weak country or in short: a bargaining chip between the two world superpowers.

In the end, the conflict has been seen as a downfall for Nikita Khrushchev. Two years after that in 1964, he was ousted from the Soviet leadership by his former comrades and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev. Sadly when he died in 1971, Khrushchev was not given a state funeral, the only former Soviet leader who did not receive that honour (and probably Gorbachev in some years to come, since he outlives the Soviet Union itself). However, this book emphasises the achievements of Khrushchev that is forgotten following his demise: he saved Cuba from a probable American invasion, kept the country aligned with Soviet communist leadership, and finally managed to get Kennedy to remove the American MRBM from Turkey. Sadly, he never got any credit for those achievements.

Instead, we are now on the brink of another nuclear conflict. This time, it is not cloaked under ideological oppositions. Even a country as small as North Korea might allegedly threaten peace through its nuclear capabilities. Yet the nuclear conflict is currently seen as a thing of the past. Somehow, I agree with Serhii Plokhy’s opinion, that we must educate ourselves about the danger of a nuclear conflict. He writes: Thus as citizens, we must reeducate ourselves about the history of nuclear weapons and the dangers they present so that a new arms-control regime can be negotiated. Elected politicians eventually listen to their electorates. As participants in democratic politics, we must relearn the forgotten lessons of the past in order to make politicians act upon them. Looking back is an essential prerequisite for moving forward.

To those of us ‘of a certain age’ - in my case a twelve year old grammar school pupil who learned of his possibly limited future prospects during a history lesson as the US naval quarantine was imposed - the Cuban Missile Crisis was an exercise in brinkmanship that seemed to demonstrate the resolve and military capability of the USA. What this masterly book demonstrates rather too clearly is the woeful gaps in the knowledge and understanding of both sides of their opponents’ motives and capabilities and the magnitude of the risks to which they each exposed their populations. As carefully evidenced by Plokhy, there was an almost fatal lack of intelligence on the part of the US of the presence in Cuba of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, and their preparedness to deploy them if Cuba was invaded - the favoured response of the US military. The author’s detailed account reveals just how close the world came to a major nuclear exchange.
The book is extremely well written and maintains the ‘what happens next?’ mood despite everyone ‘knowing’ how the crisis was resolved. It is essential reading for those who want to understand the real history of the Cold War. Highly recommended.

Such a well researched and readable book. At times It sounds like a warning to us and governments across the world and that makes its reading a must.

In October 1962, an international crisis between two of the world’s superpowers, the USA and the USSR, reached its peak—a crisis that could have easily developed into a full-blown nuclear war. Troubled by the superior nuclear arsenal of the American government, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev opted to take advantage of the fledgling communist revolution growing in America’s neighbour, Cuba. While lacking the long-range missiles the Americans had developed, the Soviets did have short and medium-range nuclear weapons, and their tactical placement under Fidel Castro in Cuba prompted great concern in America’s young president, John F. Kennedy.

In Nuclear Folly, Serhii Plokhy expertly gathers testimonies from this month of negotiation, missteps, and suspense, and weaves together the story of the Cuban missile crisis. The primary sources he refers to include recently declassified KGB files, so the reader experiences a rich account of all three leaders involved, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro. Previous studies of the crisis have often focused solely on the American viewpoint; Nuclear Folly, with its wide scope, feels authentic and balanced.

Plokhy shows how Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro’s military decision-making, miscommunications, and general mistrust for each other almost led to a major nuclear war. It’s remarkable just how many instances there were in which one wrong move could have resulted in disastrous consequences.

One thing I loved about Plokhy’s Baillie Gifford Prize winning Chernobyl was its readability, and Nuclear Folly proved equally as accessible. This book is expertly researched, and Plokhy manages to reproduce the suspense and unease of a crisis where we already know the outcome. We know that negotiations were successful and nuclear war was avoided, but Plokhy still manages to capture the tension of the period.

Many thanks to Allen Lane and NetGalley for the advance copy.

While the body of literature about the Cuban missile crisis may be ‘enormous’ as award-winning author and historian Serhii Plokhy acknowledges at the start of Nuclear Folly, there remain gaps in both ‘the coverage of the crisis and understanding it as an international, rather than solely American affair’. He does an excellent job in filling these gaps not least in the use of Soviet sources including recently declassified KGB files, memoirs and testimonies from leaders and rank and file soldiers alike. His central argument is that both sides, aside from their ideological differences and political agendas made many mistakes. They misread each other’s intentions and objectives, lacked good intelligence and had many cultural misunderstandings. Despite all of this, they also had one important thing in common, both Kennedy and Khrushchev feared nuclear war and considered it unwinnable. Fast forward 60 years and it seems that certain world leaders have forgotten or just simply don’t care how easily and quickly the world came close to nuclear war as nuclear treaties are allowed to expire and nuclear arms race starts anew, nuclear folly indeed.

Plokhy is particularly good on Khrushchev’s motives, an aggressive opportunist who then had to scramble to save face and sell the withdrawal of missiles as a Soviet victory. Another highlight is the insight into what Soviet commanders and soldiers thought and felt about being sent to Cuba. And, typically, the implementation of Soviet military aid to Cuba proved extremely difficult – the transport, the installation of missiles. Orders came top down without anyone really understanding Cuban geography and climate. Another typically socialist observation is the silence of Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid Brezhnev during the numerous Presidium meetings, he never offers an opinion or a disagreement. On the other side, what I found somewhat shocking but really, it shouldn’t have even been surprising, is the American exceptionalism – in policies towards Cuba but also shown by Kennedy personally. He simply couldn’t understand why Khrushchev would put missiles on Cuba, completely failing to see the parallel between missiles in Turkey having posed a threat to Soviet Union for years and the new threat the US faced from missiles on Cuba.

A must read for anyone with interest in twentieth century history, highly recommended. My thanks to Allen Lane, Penguin and Netgalley for the opportunity.

Author Serhii Plokhy won the Baillie Gifford Prize (my favourite book award) with, “Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy,” so I had high hopes of this. Thankfully, this new history of the Cuban Missile Crisis lived up to all my expectations.

Perhaps the most important thing about this book is that it gives far more than the usual viewpoint – very often from the American point of view; probably as the authors of previous work had most access to information from that country. Plokhy tries to give a more balanced view, with a greater proportion of the work given over to the Russian point of view and also to the Cuban. Not only is there much about Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, as well as John F. Kennedy, but also from those in close proximity to the three leaders, as well as many involved at the time, in various different ways.

It is clear that both Kennedy and Khrushchev feared nuclear war. Both men recalled the use of nuclear in weapons in WWII all too well. Now the men were in danger of beginning an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and descending into nuclear war.

This book begins with the Bay of Pigs and the Berlin Wall, before showing how Khrushchev committed the Soviet Union to helping Cuba. What is also clear is how Khrushchev initially viewed Kennedy as young, inexperienced, and weak. Cuba, meanwhile, wanted assurances from Russia that, if the US attacked them, they would go to war. Instead, they were offered missiles. As the crisis unfolds, Plokhy takes the reader into meetings, unfolding the decision-making processes, as the world stood on the brink of calamity. A fascinating history of the time, with a genuine message for the politicians of today. I received a copy of this book from the publishers, via NetGalley, for review.