I am grateful to NetGalley for providing an advance copy of this book in exchange for my honest review. 

This book, subtitled “The Origins of Russia’s War Against Ukraine” is written by a British historian and author who mostly writes about the Soviet Union and Russia. He is associated with multiple prominent UK and US ‘Ivy-League’ universities. While this may have been something to emphasis the author’s credentials in the past, given the behaviour we have observed from many universities of late (problematic and very public views around several issues including politics, culture and finance) I’m a little wary now of certain academic and ‘elite’ viewpoints of history.

The context of this book surrounds the views, actions and events of the decades following World War II, leading up to the current war in Ukraine. Particular emphasis is placed on the downfall of the Soviet Union and repercussions since. We are given a summary of Cold War issues and the largely self-inflicted disintegration of the Soviet Union; events welcomed by Europe, the US and of course the many ‘Soviet’ States that suffered under Russian domination. The contributing role of Europe, the US and in particular NATO is presented along with multiple references, footnotes and quotations.

I found the factual elements of these decades useful and the Russian views (or at least those of the Russian ‘elites’, various diplomats, military, politicians and business leaders) informative and enlightening. However the author’s tone, language, presentation of facts, his views and conclusions are largely anti-American, occasionally anti-European and seldom critical of Russia. One is left with an excellent recounting of events but a biased almost apologetic view of Russia’s actions leading up to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine invasions.

Nevertheless, this book is a great reference for those unfamiliar with or perhaps forgetful of the events of past decades. The author explains Russia’s concerns since WW II, particularly related to NATO expansion and the perceived ‘threat’ to the Soviet Union. Post the break-up of the Soviet Union, continued NATO expansion is a constant theme the author describes along with his views, and those of the US, Europe and Russia.

The author assigns much of the blame of the current conflict to NATO and Western leaders. Other background and foreground events are presented as contributory factors. The breakup of Yugoslavia, German Unification, European and American domestic & international politics and ambitions. Two Gulf Wars, conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia plus the ‘Arab Spring’ are presented, adding to the perceived threats and humiliations felt by Russia. More recent conflicts in the Arab world, particularly Libya and Syria are also presented alongside Russia’s actions, justifications and views. And of course the rise of Putin is documented and explained.

The author of course has the benefit of hindsight in forming his views and opinions as well as abundant published and private material now available. Perhaps this in some ways explains the superior, snide and sometime snarky references to US and European politicians, diplomats and military figures. Abundant quotations are presented, all referenced but frequently the context is unclear. Facts are presented as “undeniable” or “without question true”. Qualifications which are presumably not necessary, and leave me feeling a little uneasy. While participants in the West are usually named, castigated and much-maligned, those in Russia are often anonymous and vaguely referred to as Russians with certain “thoughts”, “views” or “feelings”. Given that author writes in English and perhaps his references are dominantly also in English, this is somewhat understandable. Nevertheless, it distracts from the factual events recounted and adds to the overall anti-American pro-Russian tone.

Few of the Western politicians, diplomats and military leaders receive any accolades for their actions. Disturbingly, the author judges their morals and judgements, as well as what he sees as their venal and self-serving behaviour. While Russian officials seem to be more generally viewed with tolerance, understanding and a grudging respect. Whilst he may have a point, indeed several valid points regarding Western officials, none of this actually justifies Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions into Ukraine. Are these invasions really the equivalent of the West ‘removing Kosovo from Serbia’ ?

The book draws to a conclusion shortly after the full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with abundant blame for various administrations including Reagan, Bush (HW), Clinton, Bush (W) Obama, Trump, Biden, Merkel, Macron and many more familiar names. Putin’s power has consolidated over time. The West has become ambivalent towards external conflicts. Europe has become reliant on Russia for energy resources providing prosperity.

Apart from the occasional glaring error (referring to Nord Stream II as an oil pipeline…) in totality, the book is an excellent, largely chronological recounting of events, issues, key decisions and outcomes over many decades, leading up to the war in Ukraine today. The interpretations and assumptions along with snide personal remarks clearly show the authors bias, which distracts from the factual narrative. Perhaps most useful are the author’s recounting of the Russian officials; their historical views, concerns, perceived humiliations and the circumstances that lead to their interventions and military actions in several countries, including of course Ukraine. This narrative allows the reader to better understand the Russian Worldview; without accepting or indulging their aggressive behaviour and attitudes.

Despite the above critique, I enjoyed this book, often seeking further information online when a particular person, issue or event left me wanting to know more. I recommend it to anyone unfamiliar with or forgetful of Soviet/Russian and Western/US views, activities and relationships since World War II. The author makes clear Russia’s justification for invasions of Ukraine. After reading this book, I am much better informed of the views and actions from many participants. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced the historical analysis, perceived threats and humiliations justify the Russian actions we see today.

The book delves in-depth to understand the underlying Russian psyche behind the aggressive/expansionist nature of Putin and his supporters. It seems that the arrogance of several former leaders in the US and some European states, coupled with the expansion of NATO put in motion a strong ripple effect of anger in Russia. Having travelled extensively in Russia, during the 90's, I have met a number of educated Russians who believed that the West lied to the USSR when the Warsaw Pact was disbanded. The Russian people were seemingly led to believe by Gorbachev that NATO would also be reduced in size, and would not expand into Eastern Europe.

The author has undertaken a massive amount of research and almost every statement and speech etc is backed up by references. From the reader's perspective, the book reads as a thesis and unfortunately is quite heavy in parts. Notwithstanding, it is a very interesting slant and personal perspective on why Russia went to war with Ukraine.

There is no doubting the credentials of the author when it comes to an analysis of the political history of the Soviet Union, and the evolution of Putin’s autocratic Russia, via the chaos of the Yeltsin years. His detailed knowledge of the key players, their thinking - as evidenced by documents and published speeches - and how their views of America (in particular) and the West in general have changed over time is impressive. However, the interpretation of events since the fall of the Soviet Union, particularly since Putin’s accession to the Presidency of Russia, appears to suffer from an inconsistency in relation to objectivity by his manifest distaste for the actions of the United States of America. Few, and certainly not this reviewer, would hold up US foreign policy towards the Middle East and Russia in this period as a model of consistency or selfless pursuit of the highest ideals of statecraft, but Haslam portrays the often inept handling by Presidents and administration officials as evidence of a sometimes malign approach to Russia in general, and Putin in particular.

The Maidan shootings in Kyiv are trailed by Haslam, without ever being explicit, as the likely ‘fault’ of American interference, although he, possibly reluctantly, acknowledges that it is not definitively clear who started the shooting, although the special police action is generally acknowledged to have been brutal. Haslam also makes much of the protests being local rather than widespread, without pausing to consider the possible reasons for that.

The author repeatedly refers to ‘the expansion of NATO’ as if this were simply the hegemonic behaviour of the USA, without pausing to analyse why former Warsaw Pact countries and nations formerly part of the Soviet Union should desperately wish to join the alliance, given the events in Chechnya and Georgia. Haslam acknowledges that Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare actions directed against the West, but does not significantly challenge the Putin narrative about the West having no reason to regard Russia as a potential adversary for the West. As others have pointed out ‘It takes two to tango’.

A fundamental weakness of Haslam’s synthesis of history and its current consequences is his tendency to seemingly argue two mutually contradictory positions: first the West is to blame for not responding more forcefully to sovereignty violations in the Crimea, the Donbas and the BUK shoot down whilst at the same time the West is criticised for eventually regarding the behaviour of Putin as indeed being that of a potential adversary.

The title of the book is ‘Hubris’ and, certainly, the actions of the West, particularly the USA, have at times reflected a poor analysis of the Russian psyche and, more especially, Putin’s mindset. In this regard, and to his credit, Haslam acknowledges in the closing sections of the book that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was a catastrophic blunder with potentially seriously adverse consequences for Russia, and Putin. However, he is too quick to blame some of Putin’s more outrageous claims over Ukrainian history on his ultra-nationalist friends and advisers. The Ukraine tragedy may indeed owe something to the inept handling by the West, particularly the USA, but questions relating to sovereignty and self-determination require answers reflecting the UN Charter and the wishes of the Ukrainian people. Haslam fails to explain just why it should be that Ukraine must bow to the inevitable simply because Putin wishes to be seen as a latter day Tsar recovering lands once claimed by Catherine the Great - a promise made by Putin in his 2000 Presidential election campaign…….before Ukraine had become the issue it has now become. The question thus becomes - which behaviour more typically reflects the concept of hubris.

This book is definitely worth reading, but needs a modest health warning.